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Introduction
The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat has been termed the "grand challenge" by leading counter-terrorism organizations. What started as a nuisance has turned into a strategic threat, costing the US government millions of dollars in medical, logistical, and readiness costs. 1 The US government, likewise, is spending billions of dollars and thousands of man-hours to develop defeat technologies. Some countermeasures and technical solutions are quick; many are too slow to keep up with warfighter needs. The enemy, on the other hand, adapts easily and constructs weapons that are cheap and easy to build. While the US has made great progress in combating IEDs, the government agencies fighting this threat still struggle with lengthy decision timelines and are largely reactive in nature to the threat.
The enemy is adaptive, flexible, innovative and learns quickly. The adversary evolves technologies and techniques rapidly, and as technologies and techniques mature there is no hesitation to revert back to primitive means and solutions. The US, and other strong nations throughout history, respond with countermeasures that are developed over the course of months and, more often, over a period of years. When the countermeasure is employed, the enemy has long since moved on. These countermeasures have been executed and deployed with success against the threat, but it still begs the question: why is the enemy able to evolve so rapidly and the stronger opponent struggles to adapt quickly?
Countering the IED threat raises many questions. How can the US learn to adapt faster to get inside the enemy's decision cycle? What lessons will be learned in order to combat future asymmetric weapons threats? Are there smarter ways to use technology against this threat? The fundamental question driving this research, though, is how can an organization learn more effectively in order to become flexible, adaptable, and innovative, while learning to make decisions faster and more proactively? I addressed the question by using the problem and solution research methodology. The problem is the US government continues to react to the IED threat, while the enemy adapts quickly often rendering US countermeasures obsolete as they are fielded. In this research I will explore solutions to move from a reactive to a more proactive approach to the problem at the strategic and operational levels in order to allow more proactive and timely adjustments at the tactical level.
This research project is focused on how the US government, at the strategic and operational levels, must evolve more quickly with flexibility and ingenuity to drive proactively into the enemy's decision cycle in the IED fight. This paper will draw on a historical example of the British experience with this threat in the Northern Ireland conflict. I will also examine LTC John Nagl's "learning organization" concept as expressed in his work Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, and will address the significance of learning at the operational and strategic levels. Finally, I will discuss how we can further reduce the decision timeline through innovative intelligence analysis and move more toward predictive methods of analysis.
Improvised Explosive Devices: Background
If history repeats itself, and the unexpected always happens, how incapable must Man be of learning from experience.
--George Bernard Shaw
Today's national security environment is one in which adversaries of the United States (US) seek to exploit US vulnerabilities via asymmetric means in order to erode US power, influence, and national will. 2 At various points in history, terrorists and insurgents have used Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) to advance their cause, attack a stronger adversary, and degrade the opponent's national will. IEDs are attractive weapons as they are relatively low cost, typically easy to build and deploy, and they allow the enemy to achieve both strategic and tactical results. 3 Additionally, improvised weapons can be used to compensate for a lack of conventional arms. 4 The enemy's use of IEDs to achieve strategic and tactical goals is referred to as an IED campaign, and these campaigns are characterized primarily by their asymmetric nature. 5 While it is imperative to understand the IED campaign within the greater context of the insurgency, this research paper is focused specifically on the IED campaign itself.
It is important to understand the background of the IED problem by first addressing the weapon, the casualties and the costs. I will then address the problem from a historical perspective by providing an example of how the British dealt with the IED threat during the Northern Ireland conflict. A brief discussion of the organization formed to deal with the current threat will be provided, and the background will conclude with a discussion on how the IED became the infamous weapon of the 21 st century.
Improvised Explosive Devices: The Weapon, Casualities and Costs
In 2004, US and coalition forces in Iraq faced an alarming threat: the IED. While improvised explosives have been used in past insurgencies, this was an unusual (and unexpected) threat for today's military. Military forces faced this threat with few means to counter it and with limited experience in dealing with asymmetric threats on the battlefield. 6 IEDs are weapons that represent a wide range of explosive devices. These weapons range from simple explosives detonated by a "command wire" to the more complex and lethal Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) detonated by a motion sensor and remote device. The improvised nature of these weapons allows for quick and easy modification and presents a considerable challenge in developing countermeasures. Additionally, the IED "trigger puller" benefits from decreased risk and increased effect by detonating from remote locations. 7 The Pentagon has stated that "the IED remains the single most effective weapon against our deployed forces." 8 This weapon, hardly on the minds of pre-war planners, quickly developed into a costly and frustrating struggle, and the battle against this weapon has been a continuing fight to seize and maintain the initiative.
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The struggle against this asymmetric threat is even more frustrating in light of the resulting casualties. The IRA was responsible for the largest and most diverse arsenal of bombs and explosive devices employed by an irregular force; they surpassed any other terrorist group in the types of explosives used. 20 From the command-wire detonated "culvert bomb" (especially dangerous to British army patrols) to radio-controlled detonations, the IRA quickly grew to become the experts in explosive devices. 21 The IRA's weapons ranged from very simple to some of the most sophisticated means of explosive devices and techniques.
Explosive technologies evolved quickly and so did the skills of those who built them.
The IRA bomb builders and emplacers took risks and were not afraid to assess failures and learn from their mistakes. Their tactics, techniques, technologies and procedures evolved quickly and made it difficult for the British to counter the threat. 22 Innovation and adaptability surfaced as continuing themes in the IRA's ability to learn and adjust rapidly. To evolve and survive, a weaker force must understand its weaknesses and emphasize its strengths. The IRA's ability to capitalize on their improvisation and resourcefulness bled through the entire struggle and was born out of necessity and organizational survival. 23 The IRA continuously innovated in order to manipulate and reduce weapons engagement timelines and to overcome resource limitations.
They also displayed vicious ingenuity in their targeting techniques and the rapid evolution of detonation devices. 24 At the close of the 1970s, the IRA had evolved from amateur bomb makers with sophomoric ability to advanced technology experts with unrivaled bomb-making skills. 25 The IRA came to be known as some of the most proficient bomb builders. This reputation grew largely due to the evolution of their expertise in building timing devices, creating new methods of detonation, and developing a variety of explosive materials (often home-made). 26 The IRA continuously demonstrated they had the capacity and ability to adapt their devices and techniques. They became masters of creating an environment that forced their opponent to overcome the ever-changing threat, and this was usually at the opponent's great expense in terms of lives, mission disruption and resources. 27 The IRA adapted and quickly evolved based on necessity, survival, limited resources and the need to evade detection.
Tactics and technology also evolved in this asymmetric struggle. Remote control technology presented a significant advance in the IRA's technology and this placed increasing pressure on the British to develop countermeasures. A year later-when the British finally developed jamming countermeasures-the IRA reverted back to command-wire detonation, which was immune to electronic jamming. 28 Eventually, the IRA encoded the frequencies to counter the British countermeasures. What started with a simple remote detonation device (a transmitter from a remote control aircraft) evolved to more sophisticated electronic detonation methods.
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Despite the evolution to more complex detonators, the IRA's methods remained flexible and easily adaptable. The IRA was not wedded to their technological solutions; they did not allow their advances to plateau or hinder their flexibility to revert back to simple methods. A key strength of the IRA was the organization's ability to take a primitive and improvised weapon, develop it into an advanced weapons series, and then (just as quickly) revert back to a "tried and true" method such as the command-wire detonator. 30 They had an ability to evolve their technology and their tactics to meet the situation, environment and targeting requirements.
The IRA was also in a constant state of personnel change. This continuous rotation facilitated flexibility in the organization, unlike conventional forces in which positions and ranks can become comparatively stagnant for periods of time. 31 Additionally, this organizational flexibility influenced technology acquisition and development. Expertise constantly changed and the need to improvise and evade the British army and intelligence units required the members to learn quickly. 32 The IRA was learning in terms of bomb-making and deployment, and their ability to adapt and improvise with limited resources facilitated an environment of constant change and flexibility.
The IRA learned quickly from its mistakes. The IRA learned internally and they learned from external sources such as Libya and Syria. 33 Specifically, the IRA learned targeting and detonation techniques in the use of EFPs; these weapons surfaced during Operation Iraqi
Freedom in some of the most deadly and destructive attacks against US and coalition forces.
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British explosive ordinance disposal teams, over the course of the conflict, did mature into some of the world's best. This skill has continued into the current insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, where IED attacks (and the changes in technologies and techniques) are relentless.
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The IRA learned and adjusted quickly and continuously. The IRA provided numerous examples of a disadvantaged adversary that capitalized on its strengths, and provides an important reminder to never underestimate the ingenuity and innovation of a weaker enemy. If an organization is stagnant or slow to respond, how can it expect to compete with the decision timelines of a more agile and flexible opponent? The ability to innovate and adapt fosters an environment in which an organization can more quickly evolve. It is essential to learn from history. Learning from experience and institutionalizing lessons is essential, and history provides this opportunity. However, there is little history on enemy use and friendly countering of IEDs and asymmetric weapons. In studying past insurgencies, it is important to understand the motivations and strategies of the insurgents; however, it is also important to understand the specific tactics and weapons used in order to combat current and future asymmetric weapons threats. The IED was a signature weapon in the Northern Ireland conflict; it has surfaced again as the weapon of choice in Iraq and Afghanistan. 37 There have been successes in combating the threat; however, the IED problem persists.
The 21st Century Weapon of Choice
The DoD has dedicated significant effort and resources to develop and field jammers, vehicle armor, IED detection and pre-detonation devices, and other defensive measures to combat the IED. 38 The use of IEDs has demonstrated effects far beyond inflicting causalities.
General Thomas Metz, Director of JIEDDO, stated that "IEDs are weapons of strategic influence because they attack the US national will and try to undermine and eliminate Western influence." 39 Additionally, IEDs have been employed to attack "iconic" armored military vehicles. The strategic effect is further magnified by the dissemination of video tapes of the attacks and other insurgent propaganda. 40 The IED is a weapon of tremendous effect, casualty and cost to the targeted forces. The
British dealt with the IED in Northern Ireland for decades. They learned to deal with this threat, but it was not rapid enough to proactively address the threat and gain an advantage on the enemy.
This weapon (often made with homemade explosive materials or detonated by a doorbell activator) has caused strategic effects, costs billions of dollars, and is the most significant killer on the battleground. The ability to learn quickly is critical in addressing how to respond faster and more proactively to the enemy's constantly evolving tactics, techniques and technologies.
Organizational Learning
And that's when the ingenuity came out. And you found that a lot of people had a lot of ingenuity.
--Shane Paul O'Doherty, IRA bomb-maker
Insurgent IED Tactics: Adaptation and Evolution
What has been referred to as an "arms race" between the IRA and the British was an on-going struggle throughout the conflict. The IRA developed detonation devices, the British army countered them; the IRA developed a new device or tactic, and the army responded to defeat it. It was a vicious "race" and a vicious cycle. The IRA's strength was its ability to learn and quickly adapt its tactics in the bombing campaign. British intelligence noted that the IRA was "continually learning from their mistakes and developing their expertise." 41 This same technology race or "act/react" cycle that the British and IRA experienced is occurring today in Iraq and Afghanistan between military forces and insurgents. Insurgents today are combining techniques and technologies that were developed by the IRA over the course of many years, and these current techniques and technologies are evolving rapidly and creating endless threats to be countered. 42 Recently, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that the IED gap is closing; however, he remarked that the speed of the US' evolving tactics still needs improvement. 43 Enemy tactics continue to evolve quickly and the expansion of IEDs from one warfighting theater to another continues to proliferate. There are several reasons for this expansion:
explosive materials are widely and easily available; there are numerous (and simple) triggering methods; and the tactics and techniques change constantly and can be disseminated easily on the Internet and other electronic media. However, the primary reason for the rapid expansion and proliferation of the use of the IED is it has been highly effective against more powerful, technically superior military forces. 44 For an adversary seeking an asymmetric advantage, this weapon and its means of employment are invaluable for the achieved effect.
The ability of the adversary to learn and evolve has been an important characteristic of IED campaigns in past and present insurgencies. Insurgents have shown an ability to adapt that is short relative to the ability of US forces to develop and field IED countermeasures. 45 Additionally, countermeasures often have the unintended effect of shifting the threat from one device, technology or tactic to another. 46 One of the most important aspects of adapting and evolving is the ability to learn. Learning occurs at the individual and organizational levels. An organizational environment that supports risk-taking, open communication, honest assessment of success and failure, and learning from these experiences fosters an environment that responds more efficiently to external inputs.
Learning at the Strategic and Operational Levels
Learning from history, one can see that the IRA was flexible, adaptable, and innovative.
Their technologies evolved and demonstrated remarkable ingenuity. The British had successes in combating this deadly threat, but they did not enjoy the same flexibility as their enemy. The
British dealt with long timelines to develop countermeasures, they reacted to the threat, and they did not respond quickly enough. The British, however, successfully countered an insurgency in Asymmetric weapons and methods, outwitting the opponent, and pitting strength against weakness are as old as warfare itself. 58 A military force that has a deeply ingrained conventional mindset has to have that mindset and culture challenged; the culture of the military institution has not been trained and is not designed to react at the speed of an asymmetric enemy. 59 The lessons for today are the need for an organizational culture that is flexible, comfortable with risk, innovative, adept at assessing performance and constantly learning.
Institutionalizing A Mindset to Deal with Future Asymmetric Threats
In 2008, a DoD Policy Analysis and Evaluation study group assessed the institutionalization of JIEDDO's capabilities to address future asymmetric weapons threats. This group examined the long-term organizational needs to address future asymmetric threats and reviewed measures of effectiveness and performance in JIEDDO's countering of the IED threat. 60 The study acknowledged that the use of IEDs will persist and is expected to grow based on the successful use of these weapons in Iraq and Afghanistan. The study group also noted that IEDs will remain a force-protection issue in the future. was not being shared between these professionals. Countermeasures and lessons learned should flow more readily across warfighting theaters in order to combat migrating and future asymmetric threats.
Countermeasures and the IED "Threat Chain"
When addressing countermeasures, there are various aspects of the IED threat chain that must be addressed. The basic threat chain can be categorized into three components:
organization, resources and operations. Typically, counter-IED efforts are focused on the operational element of the threat chain; however, an ideal approach to defeating the threat should include efforts to tighten the noose on the adversary at each stage of the threat chain. In the graphic, time is measured in terms of opportunity for disruption leading up to the IED attack. Opportunity for disrupting the threat diminishes and becomes crucial as time approaches the attack event. Risk, on the other hand, increases as the attack event draws near.
The brief amount of time and increased risk to military forces in the events leading up to the attack are the most dangerous, hardest to disrupt, and the most crucial moments in the IED threat chain. While each element of the threat chain must be countered, the greatest challenge is in the hours, minutes and seconds leading up to the attack. Innovation and organizational learning must be so deeply ingrained in the organization that forces can outsmart the enemy throughout the threat chain-up to the event and in the post-event phase. The intelligence, information, and indicators during this crucial period are often clouded by the "friction" of war, not recognized unless fused with other intelligence, or not timely enough for the forces on the ground.
Innovative Intelligence Analysis Smart Information, Not More Information
Intelligence proved to be crucial in the British conflict in Northern Ireland, and it was the area that provided one of the greatest challenges to the British forces. From the start of the insurgency, the IRA grabbed hold of the intelligence initiative and used it to their advantage.
The IRA was superior in intelligence operations and the British were forced to overcome a significant hurdle in this mission area. 68 Intelligence is vital also in today's counterinsurgency efforts and in combating the IED threat. JIEDDO's Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) responds to hundreds of intelligence-related requests each month from deployed forces.
These requests generally seek fused information from multi-intelligence resources, law enforcement, and operational and analytic centers to provide combat forces information for mission planning and maneuvering safely in the battle space. Deployed forces have been positive about this support because it can provide intelligence support that previously was not available at the tactical level. 69 Fused data is increasingly requested by combat forces. JIEDDO supports analytical tools that fuse and display intelligence and information from multiple sources, to include national intelligence data, tactical data from deployed units, geographical and cultural information, and imagery. JIEDDO views these tools and capabilities as "truly revolutionary." 70 Each "link" in the IED threat chain provides observables, signatures, and opportunities for interception and exploitation. 71 There is a need to detect the activities that precede an IED attack at each step in the threat chain in order to increase prediction at multiple points prior to an attack. This requires a breadth of information from human and technical sources and the ability to infer knowledge from large amounts of diverse, potentially incomplete, and near-real time data. 72 The timely and accurate use of data dictates the ability to automate data integration and analysis. As timing is critical (especially leading up to an IED attack), the ability to produce reliable, actionable intelligence from "noisy," time-sensitive, incomplete, and multi-source data becomes increasingly important. Even more vital are the needs for data acquisition, analysis, and inference as part of an integrated effort.
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Exploiting Intelligence Analysis
JIEDDO is also focused on intelligence support; this falls primarily under the "Attack the Network" line of operation. This line of operation is focused on the financial support network, the bomb builders, adversary training, and associated weapons infrastructure. 74 As this research is focused primarily on the time-sensitive intelligence necessary for deployed military forces, route clearance teams, and time-sensitive training, this is the mission area of interest for the exploitation of intelligence analysis.
A study in 2004 by the United States Military Academy (USMA) found a lack of focused and centralized theater collection and analysis of IED information. 75 While some of this has been resolved by JIEDDO's COIC, national intelligence agencies and military intelligence units, there is still room for growth. This study found a full assessment of IED information is important in examining ways to "exploit existing information sources, providing near real-time information on IED activity for implementation of preventative and responsive measures, and prediction of IED changes or improvements" to enemy tactics. 76 The study revealed the need to mine the IED data to develop a better and more thorough understanding of enemy tactics evolution and to better predict future adversary uses of asymmetric weapons. 77 It was also found that there is a continuing need for data collection and automated intelligence systems that can mine large volumes of data and find relationships in this data. 78 The USMA study found large volumes of IED incident information reported by military forces in Iraq, but found the information inconsistent to an extent that made predictive analyses of IED tactics and technology evolution very difficult. Further, the study identified a need for improved analysis capability through the leveraging of information technology capabilities and refined skill sets for assessment and analysis of IED-related intelligence information. 79 Finally, the study found that in the IED threat chain the initial stages of IED emplacement provide opportunities for interdiction through a more thorough intelligence and information analysis 80 process.
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Continued advancements in information and intelligence fusing and correlation technologies can provide the opportunity for combat forces to make decisions faster and with more accurate information. The fusion of information and integration of sensors, platforms and operational organizations can provide potential for IED detection in a more rapid and effective manner. This is critical for military forces to increase battle space awareness and gain a clearer and more comprehensive picture of friendly and adversary activities. Despite technological advances, filtering, correlating, fusing, and analyzing information to derive actionable intelligence remains a difficult task. 81 There is no single solution and many of the IED countermeasures will never fully erase the "fog and friction" on the battlefield. However, the ability to integrate, synchronize and synthesize will improve operational awareness, decrease decision-making time, and enhance detection, destruction and reduction of these asymmetric In an unconventional and asymmetric environment, operations and intelligence centers must evolve techniques and procedures much more rapidly than in past "static" wars. Current operations have changed to reflect the demands of today's asymmetric style of warfare.
Previously, structured intelligence data and information was effective when the target set was limited. Today's intelligence challenges-against a far more complicated target-are "compounded by a growing data glut, increasing noise in the environment and decreasing time available to perform analysis." 85 Instant message chat rooms have become common in today's operations and intelligence centers and have been used effectively by US and coalition forces to share tactical intelligence and threat indications. However, the amount of data can quickly become overwhelming and real-time analysis is difficult due to the unstructured nature of the data, lack of training, and other operational demands that detract from the timely value of the data.
During the NATII Consortium's meeting to discuss counter-IED intelligence solutions, much of the discussion focused on intelligence collected on the enemy and enemy systems. 
Conclusion
The IED is a weapon of strategic effect. It has become the weapon of choice in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. With the success asymmetric enemies have had against US and coalition forces, it is expected that this threat will persist in the future. The threat may change and evolve, but weaker adversaries will continue to exploit the stronger opponent's Device Defeat Operations, the goal of operational planning is to "achieve a faster decision cycle than the threat." Additionally, it states that if the enemy responds or adapts to friendly technologies and procedures, friendly forces must also rapidly change tactics, techniques, technologies and procedures. 87 This ability to adapt and remain ahead of the enemy's decision cycle must be cultivated and fostered at every level in the organization. From new defeat technologies to the way data is analyzed and managed, innovation in every aspect of the fight against IEDs is critical in gaining and maintaining the initiative against the enemy. Learning and innovative organizations are essential to countering current and future asymmetric weapons threats. Aggressive ingenuity and a culture that promotes a flexible mindset must permeate every level in the organization or it will remain a step behind a highly adaptive enemy.
